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Varity Corp. v. Howe: Will it Cause an
Increase in Litigation Against Employers
Who Administer ERISA Plans?

In Varity Corp. v. Howe,' the United States Supreme Court held that
section 502(a)(3) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 ("ERISA") 2 authorizes an award of relief to an individual for a
breach of fiduciary duty by the administrator of an employee benefit
plan covered by ERISA and affirmed the relief awarded!
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In the mid-1980s, Varity Corporation ('Varity") and its wholly-owned
subsidiary, Massey-Ferguson, Inc. ("Massey-Ferguson"), devised a
corporate reorganization designed to transfer Massey-Ferguson's moneylosing divisions and various debts to a newly created corpoiation, Massey
Combines.' One of Varity's objectives was to eliminate obligations to
pay nonpension benefits to employees in those unprofitable divisions
covered by Massey-Ferguson's self-funded employee welfare benefit
plan.' Instead of exercising its reserved right to terminate employee
benefits directly, Varity persuaded those employees to transfer to the
new- company.' The employees who transferred relinquished their
status as participants in and beneficiaries of Massey-Ferguson's plan in
exchange for coverage under Massey Combines' self-funded plan because
Varity assured them that their plan benefits would be secure.7 Varity
also transferred to Massey Combines its obligation to pay benefits to

1. 116 S. Ct. 1065 (1996) (6-3 decision).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1994). The Supreme Court cited to the 1988 version of the
United States Code. This Article cites to the 1994 version because no substantive changes

have been made to the provisions discussed.
3.

116 S. Ct. at 1079.

4. Id. at 1068.
5. Id. These benefits included "basic health, major medical, life insurance, vision care,
hearing care, and dental benefits." Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d 746, 749 (8th Cir. 1994),

affd, 116 S. Ct. 1065.
6. 116 S. Ct. at 1068.
7. Id. at 1068-69.
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certain retired5Massey-Ferguson workers without the retirees' knowledge
or permission.
When Massey Combines failed, employees who retired both before and
after the reorganization lost their benefits and sued Varity and MasseyFerguson seeking reinstatement in Massey-Ferguson's ERISA plan.9
After finding that Varity and Massey-Ferguson had harmed the plan
beneficiaries through deliberate deception while acting as ERISA
fiduciaries, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Iowa held that the companies had violated their fiduciary obligation
under ERISA section 404(a)10 "to administer Massey-Ferguson's benefit
plan 'solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries' of the
plan."11 The court also held that ERISA section 502(a)(3)' 2 authorized
the lawsuit and relief by giving the former employees the right to obtain
appropriate equitable relief for "the harm that this deception had caused
them individually." 3 The court gave the former employees a choice of
being reinstated into the Massey-Ferguson plan or taking compensatory
damages awarded by the jury14 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed but set aside the compensatory damages. 5 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari primarily to resolve disagreement among the
federal courts of appeals about the proper interpretation of ERISA
section 502(a)(3)."s The Court affirmed that section 502(a)(3) authorizes an award of relief to individuals harmed by a plan administrator's
breach of fiduciary duty.'7
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
ERISA was enacted in 1974 to protect participants in and beneficiaries
of employee benefit plans "by establishing standards of conduct,
responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries ... and by providing for

8. Id. at 1069. The Massey-Ferguson plan continued to provide benefits to employees
of Massey-Ferguson's profitable divisions that were not transferred to Massey Combines.

Id.
9. Id.
10. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1994).
11. 116 S. Ct. at 1069 (quoting ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994).
13. 116 S. Ct. at 1069.
14. 36 F.3d at 751.
15. Id. at 756. The case was submitted to a jury, but the district court made its own
findings of fact. The jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages. The district court
set aside the punitive damages and gave the plaintiffs a choice of compensatory damages
or reinstatement in the plan with payment of past-due benefits. The Eighth Circuit
modified the remedy by setting aside the compensatory damages. Id. at 751.
16. 116 S. Ct. at 1069.
17. Id. at 1079.

19971

VARITY CORP. V. HOWE

967

appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal
courts." 8 Several provisions in ERISA address fiduciary responsibility
and authorization to sue. For example, ERISA section 404(a) imposes
a "prudent man standard of care" on fiduciaries to act "solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries." 9 In addition, ERISA
section 409(a) establishes personal liability for a fiduciary who breaches
any of the fiduciary duties imposed by ERISA.2 ° Furthermore, ERISA
section 502(a) provides, in part, that a civil action may be brought by the
following parties:
(1) by a participant or beneficiary... (B) to recover benefits due to
him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms
of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms
of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for

appropriate relief under section 1109 of this title;
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or
practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms
of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to
redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this

subchapter or the terms of the plan;
(5) except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, by
the Secretary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any
provision of this subchapter, or (B) to obtain other appropriate
equitable relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce any
provision of this subchapter."

Two Supreme Court decisions interpreting ERISA provisions
contributed to the legal background of Varity. In 1985 the Court held

18. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1994). The Supreme Court has described ERISA as a
"'comprehensive and reticulated statute,' the product of a decade of congressional study of
the Nation's private employee benefit system." Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs.. 508 U.S. 248,
251 (1993) (quoting Nachman Corp. v. PBGC, 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
20. ERISA section 409(a) states:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the
responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this subchapter
shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan
resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such
fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary,
and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may
deem appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary. A fiduciary may also be
removed for a violation of section 1111 of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1994).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
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in Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell22 that ERISA
section 409 did not authorize compensatory or punitive damages against
a plan administrator who had wrongfully delayed payment of the
plaintiff's claim for benefits.23 The Court said that the text of section
409 "persuades us that Congress did not intend that section to authorize
any relief except for the plan itself."24 In Russell, the plaintiff sued
under ERISA section 502(a)(2), which cross-references ERISA section
409, not under ERISA section 502(a)(3).2" In a concurring opinion
joined by three other justices, Justice Brennan said that the Court's
narrow holding did not preclude consideration of whether ERISA section
502(a)(3) authorizes awards to individuals for a breach of fiduciary
duty.26
In 1993 the Court held in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates2 that ERISA
section 502(a)(3) does not authorize suits for legal damages, including
compensatory and punitive damages.' The petitioners asserted that
the denial of monetary damages failed to recognize "ERISA's roots in the
common law of trusts."2' However, the Court stated that even though
money damages were available against trustees in equity courts, which
had exclusive jurisdiction over actions by beneficiaries for breach of trust
at common law, equitable relief in the context of ERISA refers to relief
typically available in equity, such as injunction, mandamus, and
restitution. 0 The Court also said that the "authority of courts to
develop a 'federal common law' under ERISA... is not the authority to
revise the text of the statute."1 Therefore, courts cannot add to the
remedies listed in the statute.
After the Supreme Court decided Russell, the Ninth Circuit,3 2 the
Eleventh Circuit,33 and the Sixth Circuit34 held that ERISA section

22.

473 U.S. 134 (1985).

23. Id. at 138.
24. Id. at 144.
25. Id. at 149-50 (Brennan, J.. concurring).
26. Id. at 153-54.
27. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
28. Id. at 256-59.
29. Id. at 255.
30. Id. at 256. "[A]t common law, the courts of equity had exclusive jurisdiction over
virtually all actions by beneficiaries for breach of trust. It is also true that money damages
were available in those courts against the trustee .... " Id. (citations omitted).
31. Id. at 259. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989).
32. See McLeod v. Oregon Lithoprint Inc., 46 F.3d 956, 959-60 (9th Cir. 1995), cert.
grantedand vacated, 116 S. Ct. 1346 (1996) (for further consideration in light of Varity, 116
S. Ct. 1065).
33. See Simmons v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 940 F.2d 614, 617 (11th Cir. 1991).
34. See Vespasian v. Sweeney, 52 F.3d 327 (6th Cir. 1995).
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502(a)(3) does not authorize awards of relief to individuals for a breach
of fiduciary duty. In contrast, the Third Circuit,3 5 the Seventh Circuit, 36 and the Eighth Circuit37 have not extended the holding in

Russell to ERISA section 502(a)(3). For example, in McLeod v. Oregon
Lithoprint Inc.,8 the petitioner sued her employer and the employee
benefit plan for failing to notify her that she was eligible to apply for
cancer insurance.3 9 Her doctor diagnosed her with cancer before she
was notified of her eligibility, and she sued in part to recover compensatory damages equal to the benefits she would have received if she had
been covered.4 The Ninth Circuit said it was bound by its prior
decision in Watkins v. Westinghouse Hanford Co.41 to extend the
Supreme Court holding in Russell to ERISA section 502(a)(3) based on
the Court's language "implying that all of the statute's provisions
relating to fiduciary duties run only to plans, and not to... individuals."42 Similarly, in Simmons v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph
Co.,' the Eleventh Circuit interpreted Russell to mean that ERISA
section 409 provided the sole basis for suits involving breach of fiduciary
duty and did not authorize an individual beneficiary to recover in those
cases. 4 The Sixth Circuit also followed this reasoning in Vespasian v.
Sweeney, 5 a case that was decided after the Eighth Circuit's decision
in Howe v. Varity Corp.46
However, the Third Circuit followed the approach of Justice Brennan's
concurring opinion in Russell and held that ERISA section 502(a)(3) does
authorize an individual plaintiff to recover for breach of fiduciary
duty.4 7 The Seventh Circuit reached the same conclusion in Anweiler
v. American Electric Power Service Corp.4" after considering the
Supreme Court's limitation of its holding in Mertens to the forms of relief
available under ERISA section 502(a)(3) rather than to the parties who

35. See Bixler v. Central Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1298
(3rd Cir. 1993).
36. See Anweiler v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 3 F.3d 986, 993 (7th Cir. 1993).
37. See Howe v. Varity Corp., 36 F.3d at 755.
38. 46 F.3d 956.
39. Id. at 959-60.
40. Id. at 957.

41. 12 F.3d 1517, 1528 (9th Cir. 1993).
42. 46 F.3d at 959-60.
43. 940 F.2d 614.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 617.
52 F.3d 327.
36 F.3d 746.
12 F.3d at 1298.
3 F.3d at 992.
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could obtain relief.4 9 The court was also influenced by the Secretary of
Labor's amicus curiae brief, which took the position that Mertens allows
an individual to50 recover under ERISA section 502(a)(3) for a fiduciary's
breach of duty.

III.

RATIONALE OF THE COURT

In Varity Corp. v. Howe, the Supreme Court held in a six-to-three
decision: (1) that the employer was acting as an ERISA fiduciary when
it deliberately misled employees based on the facts determined by the
lower courts; (2) that the employer violated the fiduciary obligations of
ERISA section 404; and (3) that ERISA section 502(a)(3) gives individual
beneficiaries the right to appropriate equitable relief when they are
harmed by an administrator's breach of fiduciary obligations."
Holding that Varity was acting as a fiduciary, the Court noted that
ERISA section 3(21)(A)12 provides' that persons are fiduciaries of a plan
and are subject to ERISA fiduciary duties to the extent that they
exercise any' discretionary authority or discretionary control in plan
management or any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in plan administration. 3 Interpreting management and administration based on common law trust principles, the Court said that
"[clonveying information about the likely future of plan benefits, thereby
permitting beneficiaries to make an informed choice about continued
participation, would seem to be an exercise of a power 'appropriate' to
carrying out an important plan purpose."5 4 In addition, because Varity
did not authorize special individuals to speak as plan administrators,
reasonable employees could have thought the company Was acting both
as employer and as plan administrator when it told the employees that
their benefits would remain secure.5
Varity argued that it was not acting as a fiduciary for three reasons.
First, it was not acting as a plan administrator because neither ERISA
nor the plan instruments required it to make the statements to the
employees.5" The Court responded that the fiduciary duty would serve
no purpose if it applied only to activities already controlled by other
legal duties.57

Second, Varity contended it must have been speaking

49. Id. at 993.
50. Id.
51. 116 S. Ct. at 1068.
52.

29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1994).

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

116 S. Ct. at 1071.
Id. at 1073.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1074.
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as the employer when it discussed Massey Combines' bright future
because those statements were unrelated to plan administration.5 8
However, Varity's ultimate message of secure benefits depended in part
on its assurances about Massey Combines' future, and the Court said
that "making intentional representations about the future of plan
benefits" was an act of plan administration under the circumstances.59
Third, Varity argued that a decision to amend or terminate a plan can
be made only by an employer.'
The Court agreed but said that
making statements about the likely future of the plan is not beyond the
scope of plan administration."
The Court only briefly discussed its second holding that Varity's
deception was a violation of ERISA fiduciary standards because lying
and "deceiving a plan's beneficiaries.., to save the employer money at
the beneficiaries' expense" are not consistent with the fiduciary duties
imposed by ERISA section 404.2

The third holding resolved the split in the circuits regarding whether
ERISA section 502(a)(3) authorizes a lawsuit for individual relief. Varity
made a four-step argument that the type of relief sought by the
beneficiaries is not "appropriate" equitable relief under ERISA section
502(a)(3).13 First, ERISA section 502(a)(2) allows a plaintiff to bring a
civil action "'for appropriate relief under section 409."
Second,
ERISA section 409(a) provides that fiduciaries who breach their duties
are liable to the plan. Third, the Supreme Court had held in Russell
that beneficiaries could not recover compensatory or punitive damages
for a breach of fiduciary duty based on ERISA sections 409 and
502(a)(2). 65 Varity pointed to language in Russell that "'draftsmen
were primarily concerned with the possible misuse of plan assets, and
with remedies that would protect the entire plan, rather than with the
rights of an individual beneficiary."' Fourth, based on Russell and
ERISA's language, structure, and purposes, ERISA section 502(a)(3)
should not authorize individual relief that the Supreme
Court said
67
Congress excluded under ERISA section 502(a)(2).

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

63.

Id. at 1076.

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. (quoting Russell, 473 U.S. at 142).
67. Id.
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The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with Varity for four reasons." First, the Court stated that Russell applies to ERISA section
502(a)(2), not section 502(a)(3), and the reference to ERISA section 409,
which provides that the fiduciary is liable only to the plan, is in section
502(a)(2).6 9 In addition, the plaintiff in Russell had not sued under
7
ERISA section 502(a)(3), which authorizes only equitable relief. " The
Court further distinguished Russell because ERISA section 502(a)(1)
already provided relief for the type of injury the plaintiff in that case
7
had suffered-the wrongful denial of benefits. The Court concluded
that Russell is not controlling, 72"either implicitly or explicitly," in suits
under ERISA section 502(a)(3).
Second, the Court found that the language of ERISA section 502(a)(3)
was broad enough to cover individual relief for individuals harmed by a
73
breach of fiduciary duty.

ERISA sections 502(a)(2) and 409 do not

cover all liability for breach of fiduciary duty even though ERISA section
74 The Court
409 is titled "Liability for Breach of Fiduciary Duty."
explained, moreover, that ERISA section 502(l),7 added in 1989,
imposes a civil penalty as a percentage of the amount "'ordered by a
court to be paid by such fiduciary ... to a plan or its participants and
beneficiaries"' under ERISA section 502(a)(5), which is identical to
section 502(a)(3) except that section 502(a)(5) authorizes the Secretary
of Labor to sue. 7' Therefore, the Court concluded, the new subsection
"seems to foresee instances in which the sort of relief provided by both
subsection five and, by implication, subsection three, would include an
award to 'participants and beneficiaries,' rather than to the 'plan,' for
breach of fiduciary obligation. 7
Third, in response to Varity's argument that specific provisions control
over general ones, so that ERISA section 502(a)(2) with its reference to
ERISA section 409 controls over the general catchall provision of ERISA
section 502(a)(3), the Court noted that canons of statutory construction
are simply "rules of thumb" that sometimes help courts to interpret
68. Id.
69, Id.
70. Id.

71. Id. ERISA section 502(aXl) allows a civil action to be brought "by a participant
or beneficiary ... to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his
rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the
terms of the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1) (1994).
72. 116 S. Ct. at 1076.

73. Id.
74.

Id.

75. 29 U.S.C. § 1132() (1994).
76. 116 S. Ct. at 1076-77.
77. Id. at 1077.
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statutes.7 8 This Court viewed the canon that a specific provision
controls over a general one as a means to prevent courts from undermin'ing specific limitations by applying more general limitations -found in
other provisions of a statute." The Court concluded that Congress did
not intend the specific remedies in ERISA section 409 to be a limitation. 0 Although subsections one, two, four, and six of ERISA section
502 deal with specific areas,8 ' subsections three and five are catchall
provisions that provide appropriate equitable relief for any ERISA
violation. 2
Fourth, providing the plaintiffs with a remedy is consistent with the
purpose of ERISA as stated in ERISA section 2(b): 83 to protect
participants and beneficiaries by establishing standards of conduct for
fiduciaries, providing 'appropriate remedies, and providing access to
federal courts s4
Justice Thomas, joined by Justices O'Connor and Scalia, wrote a
strong opinion dissenting from all three of the Varity holdings8 5
Disagreeing with the majority's application of rules of statutory
construction, he argued "that Congress intended §§ 409 and 502(a)(2) to
provide the exclusive mechanism for bringing claims of breach of
fiduciary duty"8 6 because ERISA is a comprehensive statute through
which Congress "deliberately targeted specific problems with specific
solutions." 7 In addition, Justice Thomas did not agree that Varity
breached its fiduciary duty under ERISA." He said that Congress
struck a balance in the definition of "fiduciary" because Congress
understood "that virtually every business decision an employer makes
can have an adverse impact on the plan, and that an employer would not
be*able to run a company profitably if every business decision had to be

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. ERISA section 502(a)(1) addresses "wrongful denial of benefits and information;" ERISA section 502(a)(2) addresses "fiduciary obligations related to the plan's
financial integrity;" ERISA section 502(a)(4) addresses "tax registration;" and ERISA
section 502(aX6) addresses "civil penalties." Id.
82. 116 S. Ct. at 1078.
83. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
84. 116 S.Ct. at 1078.
85. Id. at 1079 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 1081.
87. Id. He would not dismiss Russell easily because the holding in that case "relied on
the language and structure of ERISA as a whole, and not solely on the text of [sections] 409
and 502(a)(2)." Id. at 1083.
88. Id. at 1084.
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made in the best interests of plan participants." 9 He stressed that an
employer is not acting as a fiduciary unless it is acting as plan
administrator. Consequently, Justice Thomas did not believe Varity's
communication with its employees about the financial prospects of
Massey Combines and the effect of ordinary business transactions on the
security of plan benefits involved plan administration for which Varity
had a fiduciary duty.9 1 He also said an employee's reasonable belief
that an employer is acting as a plan administrator does not trigger
fiduciary duty under ERISA. 2
Justice Thomas believed the holding should be limited to cases with
similar facts to prevent the undermining of "the careful balance
Congress struck in enacting ERISA.*3 He also maintained that the
holding has the potential to result in increased liability for employers,
increased litigation costs, and a reduction in plan benefits to accommodate these costs. 4
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The Supreme Court's decision continues a trend of increasing litigation
under ERISA.95 Varity leaves open several issues that the Supreme
Court eventually will need to address to provide guidance for courts and
for employers who administer ERISA plans. For example, because the
Court found it unnecessary to decide whether ERISA fiduciaries have a
duty to disclose information to employees either on their own initiative
or in response to questions," employers do not know how far they must
go to avoid misleading employees about a benefit plan or future
changes.9 7

89. Id. at 1085.
90. Id. Moreover, even some decisions that affect the plan and the participants, such
as whether to change or terminate benefits, do not involve discretionary administration of
the plan; therefore, an employer making those decisions is not acting as a fiduciary under
ERISA. Id. at 1086.
91. Id. at 1088.
92. Id. at 1089.
93. Id. at 1090.
94. Id. at 1091.
95. Charles S. Mishkind et al., Employee Benefits Litigation, in LITIGATING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES: 1996, at 223, 411-12 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 542, 1996).
96. 116 S. Ct. at 1075.
97. Robert F. Pizzo, Case Analysis of Varity Corp. v. Howe, Peacock v. Thomas, Spink
v. Lockheed Corp., Pilkington PLC v. Perelman, and Summary of Post-TravelersCases, in
FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY ISSUES UNDER ERISA-1996, at 1, 8 (ALI-ABA Course of Study
No. Q245, 1996).
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Employers will also have to decide whether to terminate plan benefits
instead of offering different coverage or benefits. 9 An employer who
chooses to offer different benefits will face a potential suit under ERISA
section 502(a)(3) if the employer provides false or insufficient information.99 Alternatively, an employer who chooses to terminate benefits
may face a suit under ERISA section 510," a provision prohibiting
employers from discriminating against participants or beneficiaries for
exercising their rights under ERISA. 101
Furthermore, in light of plaintiffs' ever-increasing attempts to assert
state common-law claims in employee benefit litigation, the Court's
approach in Varity may contribute to courts allowing plaintiffs to assert
the theories of those state common-law claims under the guise of
developing a federal common law of ERISA although those claims would
otherwise be preempted under ERISA.0 2
Another issue is the nature of the money damages awarded to the
plaintiffs as past-due benefits. 1°3 The Eighth Circuit in Varity called
the money damages restitution, but the dissent said the amounts were
actually compensatory damages for benefits owed under the plan, a
remedy that the Eighth Circuit had previously held was unavailable as
an equitable remedy."° The dissent said the majority fashioned an
equitable remedy through semantics by calling compensatory damages
"restitution" to avoid following binding precedent.0 8 However, because
this issue was not presented to the Supreme Court, lower courts will
are appropriate
continue to struggle with whether money damages
6
equitable relief under ERISA section 502(a)(3).'
Finally, Varity is indicative of a trend in the courts toward a more
liberal approach to the determination of who qualifies as a plan
participant, resulting in an erosion of the defense that the plaintiff is not
a participant in the plan."°7 Many courts are allowing plaintiffs to sue
under ERISA if they are "within the zone of interests protected" by the
statute because literal interpretations left many sympathetic plaintiffs,

98. Id. at 9.
99. Id.
100. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1994).
101. Pizzo, supra note 97, at 9. In Varity the right to sue the employer for a breach of
fiduciary duty is the exercise of a right under ERISA. Id.
102. Mishkind et al., supra note 95, at 413.
103. Pizzo, supra note 97, at 9.
104. 36 F.3d at 757 (citing Novak v. Anderson Corp., 962 F.2d 757, 759 (8th Cir. 1992)).
105. Id. at 757-58.
106. Pizzo, supra note 97, at 9.
107. Mishkind et al., supra note 95, at 413.
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like the plaintiffs in Varity,0 8 without any legal remedy."° As another case in a. trend of increasing ERISA litigation, Varity opens the
door to individual lawsuits against employers who are also plan
administrators and contributes to increasing costs of creating and
administering employee benefit plans."
TINA KNIGHT KuKANzA

108. Id. For example, the plaintiffs in Varity had no legal remedy without the Supreme
Court's interpretation of ERISA section 502(aX3) to authorize individuals to recover for a
breach of fiduciary duty. 116 S. Ct. at 1079.
109. Mishkind et al., supra note 95, at 413.
110. Id. at 255.

